We explore the celebrated Friedman rule for optimal monetary policy in the context of a laboratory economy based on the Lagos-Wright model. The rule that Friedman proposed can be shown to be optimal in a wide variety of different monetary models, including the Lagos-Wright model. However, we are not aware of any prior empirical evidence evaluating the welfare consequences of the Friedman rule. We explore two implementations of the Friedman rule in the laboratory. The first is based on a deflationary monetary policy where the money supply contracts to offset time discounting. The second implementation pays interest on money removing the private marginal cost from holding money. We explore the welfare consequences of these two theoretically equivalent implementations of the Friedman Rule and compare results with two other policy regimes, a constant money supply regime and another regime advocated by Friedman, where the supply of money grows at a constant k-percent rate. We find that, counter to theory, the Friedman rule is not welfare improving, performing no better than a constant money regime. By one welfare measure, we find that the k-percent money growth rate regime performs best.
Introduction
Central banks do not typically experiment with different monetary polices to assess their impact on inflation and welfare as doing so carries both economic and political risks. Nevertheless, such experiments would certainly be useful. In this paper we propose and implement monetary policy experiments in the controlled conditions of the experimental laboratory with the aim of understanding the welfare and inflationary consequences of various monetary policies. The study of monetary policies in the necessarily small-scale,low-stakes laboratory environment with paid human subjects is much less restrictive or expensive than experimentation in the field, thereby allowing for evaluation of a much richer and even radical set of monetary policies. Indeed, our aim is to provide new evidence on the welfare impacts of various monetary policies that would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement in the field at least without some prior evidence on their effectiveness. Our larger aim is to demonstrate that laboratory tests of monetary policies can be a complementary tool to theory and empirical analysis of field data in the evaluation of different monetary policies.
Our framework for monetary policy analysis is the Lagos and Wright (2005) search-theoretic model of money. We choose to work with this framework for two reasons. First, the Lagos-Wright model is a work-horse model in monetary economics. It is an explicitly micro-founded, dynamic search model of money with many desirable features: there is anonymous pairwise matching and lack of commitment, monitoring and record-keeping so that money plays an essential role. Periodic access to competitive markets and quasi-linear preferences enable agents to re-balance their money holdings following pairwise meetings and ensure that the distribution of money holdings is degenerate making the model tractable. 1 Second, the Lagos-Wright model's explicit dynamic structure provides us with precise welfare measures that enable us to evaluate the impact of different monetary policies in our analysis of experimental data.
Our focus in this paper is on evaluating monetary policies in the laboratory. In particular we focus on the celebrated Friedman rule (Friedman 1969) . The rule that Friedman proposed can be shown to be optimal in a wide variety of different monetary models, including the Lagos-Wright model that we use in our experiment. Walsh (2010) provides a discussion of other monetary models and the conditions under which the Friedman rule is the optimal policy in those models. We prefer the Lagos-Wright model over these other monetary models. Specifically, New Keynesian models are for the most part cashless and the Friedman rule seeks to offset the opportunity cost of holding cash balances. Cash-in-advance/money-in-the-utility function models assume that fiat money has value. Finally, in overlapping generations models, the Friedman rule is not necessarily optimal. In essence, Friedman showed that the welfare-maximizing monetary policy in the "simple, hypothetical economy" he considered, is to set inflation so as to make the nominal interest rate equal to zero. The nominal interest rate represents the private marginal cost of holding money. Since the social marginal cost of producing money is essentially zero, if the private marginal cost were positive, there would be an inefficient gap that could be closed by making the nominal interest rate equal to zero. It follows that, if the real rate of return on safe government bonds is ρ > 0, and the nominal interest rate, i, as given by the Fisher equation, is i = π + ρ, where π denotes the expected inflation rate, then, in order for i = 0 the central bank should work to set π = −ρ < 0.
While central bankers are undoubtedly aware of the Friedman rule and often express a genuine desire for low inflation, it would be very much against conventional wisdom for central bankers to argue for, let alone attempt to implement, a negative inflation rate as the Friedman rule would require. One reason for this reluctance is that deflation is thought to be associated with negative economic growth and depression. However, as Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) show using a sample of data from 17 countries over 1820-2000, there is "virtually no link between deflation and depression." 2 A second reason is that a deflationary monetary policy in a less-than-perfectly-flexible-price world seems likely to generate welfare costs that the theoretical models giving rise to the Friedman rule as the optimal policy prescription ignore. However, even in models with sticky prices and money demand, the optimal policy has been shown to involve an inflation rate that lies somewhere between the Friedman rule (deflation) and 0, see, e.g., Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) , Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) .
Indeed, the Friedman rule has played such an important role in monetary theory that we believe it is deserving of an empirical evaluation. Since central bankers are reluctant to conduct experiments in the field, we perform the exercise in the laboratory. As noted earlier, in the laboratory we are not so restricted by conventional wisdom or by fears of possible policy effects on macroeconomic performance and so the laboratory provides an ideal safe harbor in which to test the Friedman rule. We are not aware of any prior test of the Friedman rule in the lab or in the field. Friedman (1969) proposed two ways of implementing his optimal monetary policy rule. The first is to follow a deflationary monetary policy of the type outlined above. A second alternative approach is to pay a competitive market interest rate on money holdings removing altogether the private marginal cost from holding money. As with the first approach, the difficulties of providing interest on cash holdings has likely rendered this possibility impractical (though the U.S. Federal Reserve has paid interest on bank reserves since October 2008). In this paper we explore, for the first time, both implementations of the Friedman rule in our experimental Lagos-Wright economy.
We compare these two versions of the Friedman rule with two other monetary policy regimes. The first is a constant money supply regime which serves as our control treatment. The second is a constant money growth rate regime where the money supply grows at a fixed and known k-percent per period. Such a regime was also advocated by Friedman (1960 Friedman ( , 1968 , who understood well that a constant money growth rate was not the optimal monetary policy regime in the "simple hypothetical economy" of his model. Friedman advocated for a constant money growth rate rule because he thought that such a policy was better in practice than monetary policies aimed at stabilizing business cycle fluctuations: "There is little to be said in theory for the rule that the money supply should grow at a constant rate. The case for it is entirely that it would work in practice." (Friedman 1960, p. 98) To preview our experimental results, we find that the Friedman rule, as implemented using either a deflationary policy or via the payment of interest on money holdings, does not result in any welfare improvement relative to a constant money supply regime. Indeed, we find that by one measure of welfare, there are welfare gains from pursuing an inflationary monetary policy where the money supply grows at a constant k percent. We discuss several possible explanations for our findings, which are at odds with theoretical predictions. In particular, we suggest that liquidity constraints and money illusion or precautionary motives may explain the lower welfare achieved under the Friedman rule policy regimes relative to the inflationary policy regime. Indeed, one can view the main message of our paper as rationalizing the actual practice of moderate inflationary monetary policy and avoidance of the Friedman rule by central bankers, despite the fact that the Friedman rule represents the optimal policy in the economy that we study. Duffy and Puzzello (2014a) implemented a version of the Lagos-Wright model in the laboratory with the main aim of understanding the welfare consequences of having a fiat money object versus the case where no such money object exists. Monetary policy was not considered. In the finite population version of the Lagos-Wright economy we studied, there exists a continuum of nonmonetary gift-exchange equilibria in addition to the monetary equilibrium; these gift exchange equilibria are supported by a contagious grim-trigger strategy played by the society of agents as a whole (Kandori (1992) ). Some of these gift-exchange equilibria Pareto dominate the monetary equilibrium implying that money may fail to be essential (e.g., Araujo (2004) , Aliprantis et al. (2007ab) , Araujo et al. (2012) ). However, we found that subjects avoid non-monetary gift-exchange equilibria in favor of coordinating on the monetary equilibrium. Duffy and Puzzello also study versions of the model when money is not available (see Aliprantis et al. (2007) and Araujo et al. (2012) ) and find that welfare is significantly higher in environments with money than without money, suggesting that money plays a key role as an efficiency enhancing coordination device.
Related Literature
In subsequent work (Duffy and Puzzello 2014b) we studied whether subjects would come to adopt a fiat money for exchange purposes if they initially participated in a Lagos-Wright economy without fiat money (gift-exchange only). We also studied the reverse scenario where subjects initially experienced a Lagos-Wright economy with a constant supply of fiat money and then were placed in an economy where only gift-exchange was allowed (fiat money was taken away). We found that when subjects began in the setting without fiat money, they again coordinated on lowwelfare gift exchange equilibria. When fiat money was introduced (without any legal restriction on its use), subjects adopted it in exchange, but there was no improvement in real activity or welfare. By contrast, when subjects began in the setting with fiat money, they again coordinated on a more efficient monetary equilibrium but when fiat money was taken away, real exchange activity markedly declined along with welfare. We further studied the case where the fixed supply of fiat money was doubled or halved. Our aim was to study the neutrality of money proposition. We found that in the case where the fixed supply of money was doubled, prices approximately doubled and real quantities did not change in line with the neutrality proposition. However, in the case where the fixed supply of fiat money was cut in half, prices did not adjust downward and there were real welfare losses. Casari (2013, 2014) also compare outcomes across two environments, with fiat money ("tickets") and without fiat money. In their dynamic game, money is not essential to achieve the Pareto efficient outcome which can be supported instead by social norms. However, they find that the introduction of fiat money helps to support cooperation and more so in larger groups. Davis et al. (2019) study finite horizon environments with and without fiat money. They study how fiat money affects allocations both in environments where monetary exchange is an equilibrium and where it is not. They find that fiat money tends to promote efficiency in all environments, regardless of whether there is a monetary equilibrium.
Finally, Anbarci et al. (2015) study the effect of an inflation tax in the context of the Lagos-Wright model using Burdett, Shi and Wright's (2001) price-posting framework. They report that in their experiment -as in the model -inflation works as a tax as it reduces real prices, cash holdings, GDP and welfare. Moreover they find that the effect the inflation tax on welfare is relatively greater at low levels of inflation than at higher levels.
Some other experiments have also considered the impact of monetary policies primarily on expectations of inflation or the output gap or on the stability of prices. Some of these studies also have subjects play the role of central bankers. See, for example, Arifovic and Sargent (2003) , Arifovic and Petersen (2017) , Assenza et al. (2013) , Bernasconi and Kirchkamp (2000) , Cornand and M'baye (2018) , Deck et al. (2006) , Duffy and Heinemann (2018) , Fenig et al. (2018) , Hommes et al. (2015) , Krysvtsov and Petersen (2013) , Marimon and Sunder (1993 , 1994 , 1995 , Petersen (2015) , and Pfajfar andZakelj (2016 .
None of these experiments have implemented a monetary policy that was optimal for the environment studied. Further, we are not aware of any prior experimental test of Friedman's optimal deflationary policy or alternative implementations of that policy such as the payment of interest on money holdings.
Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present the most general theoretical framework that guided our experimental implementation. The theoretical framework is based on the Lagos and Wright (2005) model, a microfounded model of money sufficiently tractable to be integrated with mainstream macroeconomics. We discuss the baseline economy as well as the three different monetary policy regimes that we also implement as distinct treatments. It is well-known that there is an autarkic equilibrium where money has no value. We focus on the monetary equilibrium where fiat money is valued. In what follows, we describe the economic environment and the optimization problem characterizing the monetary equilibrium solution. More details can be found in Lagos and Wright (2005) or Rocheteau and Nosal (2017) . 3 There are 2N infinitely-lived agents who discount the future with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). Each period consists of two rounds. In the first round (decentralized market, DM), agents are randomly (uniformly) and bilaterally matched and an agent in each pair is randomly chosen to be the producer or the consumer of the DM good with equal probability. Each consumer proposes terms of trade and the producers' choice variable is to accept or reject the proposed terms of trade.
In the second round (centralized market, CM) agents decide on consumption and production of the CM good and their fiat money savings (or equivalently how much money to carry over to the next decentralized market round). That is, they decide how much to sell or buy in the Walrasian market in order to rebalance their money holdings. The combination of DM and CM markets captures the idea that in some markets it is easier to trade and find a counterparty than in other markets. Goods are divisible but perishable. There is also an intrinsically worthless and inconvertible object referred to as fiat money. Fiat money is both divisible and durable. Let
t denote the distribution of money holdings at the beginning of period t, where m i t denotes the money holdings of agent i at the beginning of period t. The initial money supply is given by
3 See also Lagos, Rocheteau and Wright (2017) for a discussion of the advantages of this framework.
Let φ t denote the price of money in terms of the general good in the centralized market in period t. Also, let ϕ : A A be an exhaustive bilateral matching rule, so that no agent remains unmatched. 4 Let M t denote the total stock of fiat money at the beginning of the centralized market in period t prior to any injection or withdrawal. Assume that this stock expands at the gross rate μ so that M t+1 = μM t , where M t+1 denotes next period money supply. Money is injected or withdrawn by way of a lump-sum transfer or tax τ t levied on agents at the end of the CM. Suppose that the government can pay interest, i m , on money holdings at the beginning of the CM. In each period t, the government budget constraint is given by
We denote by x and y consumption and production of the DM good during the first round, and by X and Y production and consumption of the CM good in the second round. Period preferences are given by U (x, y, X, Y ) = u(x) − c(y) + X − Y , where u and c are twice continuously differentiable with u > 0, u < 0, c > 0, c ≥ 0. There exists a q * ∈ (0, ∞) such that u (q * ) = c (q * ), i.e., q * is efficient as it maximizes surplus in a pair. Also, letq > 0 be such that u(q) = c(q).
The periodic access to the centralized market in conjunction with the quasilinearity of preferences deliver tractability and thus a closed-form solution for the monetary equilibrium. Following the same steps as in Lagos and Wright (2005) , given the quasi-linearity assumption and take-it-or-leave-it trading protocol, 5 the amount of money carried over from the centralized to the decentralized market (or savings), m i t+1 , solves a sequence of simple static optimization problems:
That is, the choice of how much money to bring to the next DM, is governed by trading off the benefit (the liquidity return to money) given by β 1 2 u(q t+1 (m i t+1 ) − (1 + i m )φ t+1 d t+1 (m i t+1 ) with the opportunity cost of holding money −(φ t − β(1 + i m )φ t+1 )m i t+1 associated with delayed consumption. Any equilibrium must satisfy φ t ≥ β(1 + i m )φ t+1 or μ ≥ β(1 + i m ). Thus note that the minimum inflation rate consistent with an equilibrium is φt φ t+1 = μ = β(1 + i m ), i.e., the Friedman rule. Also, note that under the Friedman rule, the opportunity cost of holding money is zero.
The optimization problem described above delivers the following equation for the steady state monetary equilibrium solution: 6
.
(1)
Note that q ≤ q * since μ ≥ β(1 + i m ), and that q → q * as μ → β(1 + i m ). The monetary steady state value function is given by
Implementations of the Model
In the laboratory, we consider the following four implementations of the model. 4 An exhaustive bilateral matching rule is simply a function ϕ : A A such that ϕ(ϕ(a)) = a and ϕ(a) = a, for all a ∈ A. See also Aliprantis et al. (2007) .
5 The take-it-or-leave-it trading protocol delivers the most efficient allocation in the class of generalized Nash bargaining trading protocols.
6 See also Rocheteau and Nosal (2017) .
1. Baseline-Constant M. In the baseline economy, money supply is constant (μ = 1) and no interest is paid on money (i m = 0). Therefore, since β < 1, it immediately follows from equation (1) that q < q * .
2. Friedman rule-FR-DFL. The first implementation of the Friedman rule is characterized by money supply contraction via lump-sum taxation and no interest payment on money (i m = 0). Specifically, in order to achieve the first best q * , we set μ = β. Lump-sum taxes satisfy the budget constraint 2N τ t = (μ − 1) M t . Clearly, the monetary equilibrium entails q = q * under this policy.
3. Friedman rule-FR-IOM. The second implementation of the Friedman rule is characterized by interest payment on money (financed via lump-sum taxes) and constant money supply, i.e., μ = β(1 + i m ) = 1. Lump-sum taxes must then be equal to the interest payment 2N τ t = −i m M t . As in FR-DFL, the monetary equilibrium DM quantity is q = q * under this policy. 7 4. k−percent rule-k-PCT. In this implementation, we consider an inflationary monetary policy where the money supply growth rate is fixed and publicly announced and no interest is paid on money (i m = 0). Money supply growth is achieved via lump-sum transfers at the end of the CM. Since μ > 1, the monetary equilibrium quantity achieved under this policy is lower than in the baseline economy.
Note that the first, third and fourth regimes can be all viewed as k -percent rules regimes, with zero, negative and positive k, respectively.
Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical model, we formulate the following hypotheses that we will test using our experimental data. First, assuming individuals seek efficient outcomes, we conjecture that they coordinate on the monetary rather than the autarkic equilibrium:
Hypothesis 1 The monetary equilibrium rather than the autarkic outcome better characterizes trading behavior.
Second, consistent with Friedman's theory of the optimal quantity of money, we have: Further, the manner in which optimal policy is implemented should not matter:
Hypothesis 3 There is no difference in quantities traded or welfare between the two Friedman rule treatments, FR-DFL or FR-IOM.
Third, in the environment we consider without growth, inflationary monetary policy should be worse than a regime where the money supply remains constant. 
Experimental Design
Our experiment involves four treatments, all of which use the Lagos-Wright (2005) economy in a laboratory setting. We first discuss how we implement the baseline, constant money supply treatment and we then discuss the other three treatment variations.
Each session of the baseline treatment involves 2N players or subjects. Each session consists of a number of "sequences" or supergames. At the start of each new sequence all subjects are endowed with M/2N "tokens," our name for fiat money, and a fixed number of points, P. Subjects are instructed that tokens, in keeping with fiat money, have no redemption value (intrinsic value); only their point totals matter for final payoffs. Each sequence consists of an indefinite number of periods. Each period involves two rounds of decision-making: the decentralized market (DM) round and the centralized market (CM) round.
In the first decentralized market (DM) round, all 2N subjects are randomly and anonymously paired with one another to form N pairs. One subject in each pair is randomly chosen to be the consumer with the other being the producer; subjects are instructed that their chance of being the consumer (producer) in each DM round is 50 percent. Each consumer i moves first, making a proposal of {q i , d i }, where q i is the amount of the special good that i requests his matched producer to produce and d i is the amount of fiat money i offers the producer in exchange. We
, where q is an upper bound on exchange and d DM i is i's initial DM money holdings. Producer j moves second, by either accepting or rejecting his matched consumer i's proposal. In the event that a proposal is accepted, the proposal is immediately implemented. The consumer acquires q i units of the DM good, earning u(q i ) points that get added to the consumer's point total, but gives away d i tokens (units of money). The producer incurs a production cost of c(q i ) points that is subtracted from the producer's point total, but acquires an additional d i tokens (units of money) as part of the exchange. If the producer does not agree to the consumer's proposal, then no trade takes place and thus DM earnings are 0 points for both consumer and producer.
In the second centralized market (CM) round, all 2N subjects meet together to participate in a centralized market for a homogeneous good "X." The purpose of the CM meeting is to allow re-balancing of money holdings. As in Duffy and Puzzello (2014a) , the market for the homogeneous good X is implemented using a Shapley-Shubik (1977) market game. 8 Specifically, subjects can choose to be either buyers or sellers of good X. If player i chooses to be a buyer, s/he specifies an amount of tokens, b i to bid toward units of good X subject to 0
is i's initial CM money holdings (following any DM exchanges). If player i chooses to be a seller, s/he specifies the number of units of good X, Q i s/he is willing to produce. We assume linear benefits and costs in the CM market in keeping with the quasi-linear specification for preferences. That is, the utility benefit of one unit of good X, U (X), is 1 point and the cost of producing one unit of good X, C(X), is also 1 point and these facts are known to the subjects. The centralized market price of good X is determined by:
All exchanges take place at this market clearing price. If there are no bids or no supply of good X, then there is no market price and no centralized market exchange. Following completion of the CM market, money balances and points are adjusted according to the CM outcome and the CM meeting round ends. Specifically, successful buyers of good X earn U (b i /P ) = b i /P points, and sellers of good X earn −Q i points.
Following the completion of the CM round, a random number (an integer) is drawn from the set {1, ..., 6} to determine whether the sequence continues with another two-round period.
If the random number drawn is less than 6, then the sequence continues; subjects' point and token balances carry over to the next two-round period. Otherwise, the sequence ends, point balances are final and token balances are zeroed-out. The random continuation of each sequence with probability β = 5/6 is a commonly used way to implement both discounting and the stationarity associated with an infinite horizon. 9 Depending on the time remaining in the session, a new sequence may be then played. Subjects would begin each new sequence with M/2N tokens and P points. At the end of the session following completion of the final supergame, subjects are paid their point totals from all sequences played.
Friedman Rule Treatments
In addition to the baseline constant money treatment (described in the last section), we consider two different implementations of the optimal monetary policy (Friedman) rule for that baseline environment.
In the first implementation of the Friedman rule, known as the Friedman Rule Deflation treatment (FR-DFL), we contract the aggregate money supply by the amount (1 − β)M at the end of each two-round period, following completion of the CM market and execution of all exchanges 8 Lagos and Wright (2005) model the CM as a Walrasian market. We chose to implement the CM market as a market game, as market games can be viewed as providing non-cooperative game theoretic foundations to price taking behavior in large populations. Further, Duffy, Matros, and Temzelides (2011) find that groups of size 20 act like price takers and the resulting outcomes are in line with the unique competitive equilibrium of the associated pure exchange economy they study. On the other hand, outcomes in groups of size 4 are closer to a Nash equilibrium prediction that differs from the competitive equilibrium. We also think it is desirable to have prices endogenously determined.
9 The use of random termination to implement indefinite horizons begins with Roth and Murnighan (1978) . Alternative approaches include finite horizon economies with final round coordination games that avoid unraveling due to backward induction (see, e.g., Cooper and Kühn (2014) and Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) , Davis et al. (2019) ). We see these alternatives as more complicated to implement, and we did not want to add further complexity to our design.
from that market. The money supply reduction is implemented by reducing all subjects' money holdings so that in the aggregate, M t+1 = βM t . Recall that μ = β is the optimal policy in the case where no interest is paid on money, i.e. where i m = 0. The reduction is levied as a lump-sum tax on individual money holdings at the end of CM and would be applied to each individual's money holdings. By the government budget set and given μ = β, it follows that τ t = β−1 2N β t−1 M 1 where M 1 is the initial money supply. Thus if subject i holds d i,t tokens following settlement of the CM, then, in the event that the sequence continues from period t to period t + 1, this subject will have
In theory, reducing the money supply by the rate β − 1 per period will perfectly offset the time-delay risk associated with holding money so that the real return to holding money is constant and equal to the rate of time preference.
In the second implementation of the Friedman rule, known as the interest on money (FR-IOM) treatment, we pay an interest rate of i m on money holdings held at the beginning of the CM following any DM exchanges. The interest payment is proportional to each subject's money holdings. Thus, if a subject has d i,t tokens after trades have occurred in the DM, then the subject's money holdings are increased to (1 + i m )d i,t . Recall that in the FR-IOM treatment the optimal monetary policy is to set μ and i m so that μ = β(1 + i m ). If the policymaker wishes to achieve the first best without contracting the money supply, then the interest on money should be financed by some lump-sum transfers in addition to (possibly) money growth. The policy rule
. This tax rate is levied on agents' money balances following the completion of the CM market, after all exchanges have taken place in that market. Thus if subject i leaves the CM market with d i,t tokens, she will have
tokens at the start of the next two-round period, if there is a next period. Notice that implicitly, the interest on money payments is being financed by a combination of an increase in the money supply or a tax on money holdings. In the experiment we set μ = 1 so the interest on money payments is financed only by lump-sum taxes on money holdings.
The precise details of the FR-DFL and FR-IOM rules are clearly revealed to subjects, along with the timing of money injections or contractions. At the start of each sequence in a session, (round 1), subjects are endowed with M 1 /2N units of money and the policy rule is implemented beginning with round 2 and thereafter in all rounds of the sequence. The money stock is reinitialized at the start of each new sequence and the policy is implemented anew so that subjects gain some experience with the consequences of the policy. The FR-DFL and FR-IOM treatments represent two alternative means of achieving the goal of a zero nominal interest rate, or in this case, compensating money holders for the time/risk delay of holding money. In our experiment the risk is that money (tokens) will cease to have value with probability (1 − β).
k-Percent Rule Treatment
Our final treatment involves the constant k-percent money rule, also advocated by Friedman, even though it is not theoretically optimal for the baseline economy. We implemented the k-percent rule (treatment k-PCT) by lump-sum transfers of tokens at the end of the CM market. Specifically, we increased the total stock of money by k percent each period and distributed the additional tokens equally among all subjects. As in the other treatments, the precise details, including our choice for k, were clearly revealed to subjects, who were able to see that their token holdings were increasing at the end of each CM.
Parameterization and Predictions
The model was parameterized as follows. We set the discount factor (or probability of continuation) at β = 5/6 (.83) as in our earlier work (Duffy and Puzzello 2014ab) . The DM utility function we chose for this paper is different; in particular we chose a CRRA function: u(q) = 1.635 q (1−0.224)
(1−0.224) . The DM cost function was linear, c(q) = q. This choice implies that the first best solution is:
By contrast, the monetary equilibrium solution in the DM of the baseline, constant money treatment, is given by:
We chose this parameterization for the model in order to make the difference between the first best and the monetary equilibrium solution sufficiently large so that we could detect which solution subjects were likely coordinating upon. 10 The utility and cost functions in the CM are both linear for simplicity. We set the number of pairs in each session, N = 7. Further each of the 2N = 14 subjects starts off with 10 tokens. Thus, the total stock of money in the first two-round period of every new sequence is M 1 = 140.
In the deflation version of the Friedman rule (FR-DFL), at the end of each two-round period, the money stock is decreased at rate β − 1 or -16.67% per period which implies a deflation of the price level at the same rate. In the interest on money version of the Friedman rule (FR-IOM) we set i m = 0.20 so that subjects earned 20 percent interest on their beginning of CM money balances; that is, the interest was proportional to each subjects' beginning of CM token balance, d. The 20 percent interest rate choice was the solution to μ = 1 = β(1 + i m ), using our choice for β = 5/6. The revenue needed to cover this 20 percent interest payment was provided by a lump-sum tax of 2 tokens per subject. The real effects of monetary policy come from this lump-sum taxation scheme. In the end, the total stock of money in the FR-IOM treatment remains fixed at M = 140 (since μ = 1) so there is neither inflation nor deflation of the price level in this treatment. Finally, in the constant, k-percent money growth rate treatment (k-PCT), we set k = 1 − β so that the total stock of money increased by 16.67% per period. We chose this rate for symmetry with the constant deflation rate (β − 1) that was used in the first Friedman rule treatment, FR-DFL. Since β = 5/6 in the k-PCT treatment, the rate of inflation of the price level, by design, should be 1 − β or 16. 67%. 11 Given our parameterization of the model, the steady state predictions are provided in Table  1 . Note that the first best quantity is only attainable in the two Friedman rule treatments, where welfare is also predicted to be the highest across the four treatments. 12 Welfare is lowest in the k-percent monetary policy regime. The last two columns provide welfare comparisons in absolute terms as well as relative to the first best. Specifically, column six provides the expected lifetime 10 In Duffy and Puzzello (2014ab) we set the DM utility function, u(q) = 7 ln(1+ q). With this choice, the first best solution, q * = 6 while the monetary solution,q = 4, which are rather close to one another in levels and in welfare terms. For these reasons, we changed to the CRRA specification for u(q) that we use in this paper.
11 The rate of inflation or deflation in our k-PCT and FR-DFL treatments may seem high by comparison with actual monetary policy practice. We purposely chose a high rate, 16.67%, in order to make the theoretical predictions discernible across our four treatments given the noisy nature of experimental data.
12 Welfare is computed as expected discounted lifetime payoff, (1/(1−β))(1/2)[u(q)−c(q)] using the parameterization of the model. 
Procedures
The experiment was conducted over networked PCs using the zTree software (Fischbacher 2007) .
For each session we recruited 14 subjects with no prior experience with our experiment. The students were drawn from the undergraduate population of UC Irvine and were paid on the basis of their performance in the experiment. 13 We employ a between subjects design where a single monetary policy regime is in effect for the duration of a session. At the start of each session, subjects were given written instructions which were also read aloud in an effort to make the instructions public information. The instructions for the FR-DFL treatment are provided in Appendix B. Other instructions are similar. 14 After the experimenter finished reading the instructions, subjects had to correctly answer a number of quiz questions testing their comprehension of the environment in which they would be making decisions. After all subjects had correctly answered all quiz questions, the experiment started. The instructional time took approximately 45 minutes.
Each session consisted of a number of sequences, with each sequence consisting of an indefinite number of periods. Subjects were instructed that a sequence would continue to another period with probability β = 5/6 and would terminate with probability 1 − β = 1/6. 15 Subjects were not told the number of sequences that would be played. Instead, they were instructed "if a sequence ends, then depending on the time available, a new sequence will begin."
In practice we let the program choose 5 realizations for the number of sequences and lengths of those sequences. Then, we used the same realizations for the five sessions of each treatment to facilitate comparisons across treatments. The number of sequences and lengths are shown below in Table 2 . 13 There is evidence showing that student subjects behave similarly to professionals in a number of experiments comparing these two populations -see Fréchette (2015) . More generally, monetary policies impact on students and professionals alike.
14 The complete set of instructions can be found at https://www.socsci.uci.edu/~duffy/MonetaryPolicy/. 15 We follow the interpretation of discount factor as probability of continuation, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006) . See Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) for different implementations of infinite horizon economies in the context of infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games. Also, see Davis et al. (2019) for theory and experiments in finite horizon economies where money is valued.
Each session lasted approximately 2 hours and subjects were paid their earnings from all periods of all sequences played.
The common features of all four treatments were as follows:
Each subject was endowed with 20 points for the session. At the start of each sequence, each subject was endowed with 10 "tokens". Tokens had no redemption value in terms of points, so they were intrinsically worthless like fiat money. Token balances carried over from period to period but not from sequence to sequence. Subjects could use tokens to earn points and subjects' point balances carried over from period to period and across sequences. Subjects final point balances from all sequences including the initial 20 point endowment were converted into dollars at a fixed rate of 1 point = $0.40.
Each period consisted of two rounds. In the first round (the decentralized market (DM)), subjects were randomly and anonymously paired. In each pair, one member was randomly chosen to be the consumer and the other the producer. The consumer moved first, proposing an amount of the DM good that the matched producer would produce for the consumer and offering some number of tokens if the producer agreed to that proposal. Proposals for quantities of the DM good could range from 0 to 27 units of the DM good and consumers could offer from 0 to their current token balances in exchange. 16 After viewing the consumer's proposal, the producer had to decide whether to accept it or not. If accepted the proposal was implemented; the producer produced q units at a cost of −q points and the consumer gained u(q) points, but gave up d tokens to the producer. Adjusted token balances carried over to the next CM round.
In the CM round, subjects could choose whether to 1) produce the CM good X 2) consume the CM good X, 3) do both or 4) do neither. Each subject could choose to produce between 0 and 27 units of good X at cost of 1 point per unit produced and sold. 17 Each subject could also bid from 0 to the amount of tokens they carried over from the DM to buy and consume units of good X. The utility gain from a unit of good X was 1 point. Subject were instructed that the CM price would be determined by the ratio of the sum of all bids to the sum of the quantity produced. Consumption of good X in terms of points was determined by the ratio of each subjects' bid divided by the single CM price, since the utility function in the CM round is linear.
At the end of each CM round, subjects learned their points for the period (from both DM and CM), and their updated points for the sequence. Then the realization of the random draw was revealed. If the number drawn was less than or equal to 5, the sequence continued with another period and subjects' token holdings carried over to the DM round of the new period. Otherwise if a 6 was drawn, the sequence ended.
The features that differed across treatments were as follows:
In the baseline, constant money treatment, the money supply remained constant at 14×10 = 140 tokens and this fact was public information.
In the Friedman rule -deflation treatment (FR-DFL), following the first period of each sequence, the total money supply was contracted via lump-sum "token taxes". This token tax collection followed the completion of the CM. Subjects were instructed that each period, the stock of tokens M would be reduced by 16.67%. The tax burden was shared equally according to a lump-sum tax. The per subject tax was computed for subjects by the computer program and a tax table was also provided for them. In the second implementation of the Friedman rule, FR-IOM, subjects received a proportional 20 percent interest on their token holdings at the beginning of the CM but were paying a lump-sum tax at the end of the CM. The interest payment and lump-sum taxes were chosen to keep the money supply constant. In the event that subjects did not have enough tokens to pay the tax, they were forced to produce units of the CM good at the most recently determined CM price in order to generate enough tokens to pay any tax shortfall. In the k-PCT treatment, following the first period of each sequence, the total money supply was expanded via lump-sum token transfers. These tokens transfers followed the completion of the CM. Subjects were instructed that each period, the stock of tokens M would be increased by 16.67%. We chose the money supply growth rate to be the same as the money supply contraction rate in FR-DFL so that the predicted inflation and deflation rates would be the same. As in the FR-DFL treatment, the token transfer was computed for subjects by the computer program and a table listing lump-sum transfers was also provided for them.
Experimental Results
We report on data from five sessions each of our four treatments. 18 Each treatment involved 14 inexperienced subjects. Thus, we report on data from 5 × 4 × 14 = 280 subjects. A summary of the experimental sessions is provided in Table 2 . Table 3 shows percentage of proposals involving positive tokens amounts and the acceptance rates for such proposals per period, averaged over the first half, second half and all periods of each sequence, by session and treatment.
Proposals and Acceptance Rates
Note first that the monetary proposal frequencies in Table 3 are all conditional on the consumer having positive token holdings. 19 Further, 90 percent or more of these proposals involve positive amounts of tokens. Therefore we find strong support for Hypothesis 1; it seems that subjects value tokens in exchange so that the monetary equilibrium is a better characterization of their behavior than autarky. On the other hand, the acceptance of the money offers as shown in columns 6-8 is less than 100 percent (as it would be in the monetary equilibrium). However, it is also the case that acceptance rates are not zero as they would be in an autarkic equilibrium. The roughly 40-50 percent acceptance rates are in line with our earlier experimental results (Duffy and Puzzello (2014ab) ) and are explained below by the offer terms that producers faced. Table 4 reports on Producer's acceptance of money offers using a random effects probit regression estimation with standard errors clustered at the subject level. 20 As the table reveals, producers are more likely to accept consumers' DM proposals if the amount of tokens offered, d, is higher and the quantity they are asked to produce, q, is lower (see specification 1). Alternatively, if the terms of trade as captured by the ratio d/q are better (specification 2) then producers are more . likely to accept a consumer's offer. Money holdings of the consumer (m c ) or the producer (m p ) do not seem to matter much for acceptance decisions, nor do there appear to be significant treatment differences in acceptance rates. Finally, there is some decay in acceptance rates over time within a sequence (SeqPeriod) but not at the start of a new sequence (NewSeq). Table 5 shows period average quantities and token amounts from accepted proposals in the decentralized markets over the first half, second half and all periods of each sequence, by session and treatment. Relative to the predictions given in Table 1 the average traded quantities depart from the steady state values. However, we can still consider whether average traded quantities conform to the comparative statics treatment predictions. We find mixed support for Hypothesis 2. In particular, relative to the Constant M treatment, quantities in the FR-DFL treatment are on average slightly higher, but quantities in the FR-IOM treatment are essentially the same. Contrary to Hypothesis 4, quantities in the k-PCT treatment are higher than in the Constant M treatment. Inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, quantities in the FR-DFL version of the Friedman rule are on average slightly higher than in the FR-IOM version.
DM Quantities and Tokens Traded
A more formal analysis is provided in Figures 1-2 and in a regression analysis reported on in Table 6 . Figure 1 shows mean DM traded quantities using data from all sessions of each of the four treatments along with 95 percent confidence intervals. Figure 2 does the same for mean DM traded In Table 6 we report results from OLS regressions of traded DM quantities on dummies for the treatments FR-DFL, FR-IOM and k-PCT with standard errors clustered at the subject level; the baseline treatment is the Constant M treatment. Notice that the baseline DM quantity is approximately 4. Again, we find that traded quantities are significantly greater by 1 unit in the .10) , regardless of whether we restrict the sample to strictly positive traded quantities or not. Figure 1 confirms the latter finding, as the confidence intervals for the FR-DFL and FR-IOM treatments overlap.
Welfare Comparisons
We next turn to a comparison of welfare differences across our four treatments. Since utility is linear in the CM, and that market should only be used to rebalance money holdings (i.e., in the CM there are no aggregate payoff consequences) one measure of period welfare -overall welfareprices is calculated as d/q. amounts to computing the surplus u(q) − q, achieved by each pair in the DM round of each period multiplied by the number of pairs (7). However as noted in Table 3 , only between 40 and 50 percent of proposals are accepted on average. The theory predicts 100 percent acceptance rate regardless of the monetary regime. That is, in theory, monetary policies should not affect the extensive margin, i.e., whether trade occurs or not. Instead, monetary policy impacts only the intensive margin, i.e., the quantity of the DM good traded. Since in the data, we do not find that all proposals are accepted, to better understand the welfare consequences of various monetary policies, we construct a second measure of welfare -intensive margin welfare-that computes the average DM surplus achieved by pairs who agreed to trade. This second welfare measure better captures the intensive margin effects of monetary policies.
To make better sense of both welfare measures we report the ratio of each welfare measure to the first best level over all periods and over the first and second half of each sequence, by session and treatment in Table 7 . Regarding the intensive margin welfare measure, we find that welfare is highest in the k-PCT treatment and lowest in the FR-DFL treatment. Regarding the overall measure, differences in welfare across treatments are less pronounced, but this may reflect the different acceptance rates across treatments. For example, in the k-PCT treatment, pairs trade higher amounts on the intensive margin, (see Table 6 ) but higher rejection rates in this treatment (as confirmed by Table 4 above) reduce the overall welfare measure in this treatment.
Statistical evidence for treatment differences in these two welfare measures across treatments is provided in Figure 3 and Table 8 . Figure 3 shows mean intensive margin welfare across the four treatments along with 95 percent confidence intervals. As the figure reveals, intensive margin welfare is not significantly different across the treatments Constant M, FR-DFL and FR-IOM. However, the intensive margin welfare ratio is significantly higher in the k-PCT treatment relative to the other three treatments. Considering overall welfare, Figure 3 reveals no significant differences in these ratios across all four treatments.
In Table 8 , the dependent variables are intensive margin welfare for each period or overall welfare for each period. The first regression involving the intensive margin welfare measure again shows that welfare is significantly higher in the k-PCT treatment relative to the baseline Constant M treatment. The same is true for comparisons between k-PCT and either FR-DFL and FR-IOM according to Wald tests (p < .01 for both tests). There are no other pairwise treatment differences. The finding that intensive margin welfare is highest in the k-PCT treatment is at odds with the theory. We discuss why this might be the case later in section 5.7.
The second regression involving the overall welfare measure shows that welfare is marginally higher in the FR-IOM treatment compared with the Constant M treatment. Overall welfare in the FR-IOM treatment is also marginally greater than in the FR-DFL treatment according to a Wald test (p = .0815). There are no other pairwise treatment differences using the overall welfare measure. The difference between the welfare results using the intensive margin versus the overall welfare measure can be attributed to the differences in proposal acceptance rates. As Table 3 reveals, acceptances were highest in FR-IOM and lowest in k-PCT. As we have noted, monetary policies are not predicted to impact on acceptance rates; in equilibrium acceptance rates are supposed to be 100 percent. Since they are not, the intensive margin welfare is, in our view, a more accurate measure of the impact of monetary policy.
Price Levels
We now consider the effect of our different monetary regime treatments on DM and CM price levels. In the next section we will consider rates of change in these prices over time. Table 9 shows mean DM and CM prices over the first half, second half and all periods of each sequence by session and treatment. 5 show mean DM and CM prices across the four treatments along with 95 percent confidence interval bars. The first bar in these figures shows the mean DM or CM prices in the first period of each new sequence while the second bar shows mean DM and CM prices over all periods.
Recall from Table 1 that the mean first period DM price across treatments is, from lowest to highest, 1.11 for the two FR treatments, 5 for the Constant Money treatment and 15.38 for the k-PCT treatment. As Figure 4 reveals, the first period prices generally differ from these level predictions (except for the FR-IOM treatment), but there is support for the predictions qualitatively as the lowest prices are observed in the two FR treatments and the highest are observed in the k-PCT treatment. The mean first period CM price predictions are the same except for the FR-IOM treatment, where the CM price is 1.33, reflecting the temporary 20 percent increase in the money supply from interest payments. Again, we see in Figure 5 qualitative support for the predictions, though again the data are generally different from the precise level predictions. In Table 10 we report on an OLS regression of all DM and CM prices on dummy variables for the three treatments FR-DFL, FR-IOM and k-PCT; for DM prices, standard errors are clustered at the subject level. Consistent with qualitative predictions of the theory (see Table 1 ) and Hypothesis 
Prices Over Time
We next discuss our results regarding Hypothesis 6, which concerns changes in prices over time in the DM and CM. We first compare the FR-DFL and k-PCT treatments where we expect deflation and inflation of the price levels, respectively. Recall that in the FR-DFL, the deflation rate of both the DM and CM price should be 16.67 percent over time, while in the k-PCT treatment, the inflation rate of both the DM and CM price should be 16.67 percent over time. Table 11 regresses the log of the average DM and log of the CM prices each period on the period number within each sequence and four session dummies. In the DM, prices are marginally lower over time in the FR-DFL treatment and not changing much in the k-PCT treatment. By contrast, in the CM, prices in the FR-DFL are significantly decreasing over time at an estimated rate of -14.1% per period, while in the k-PCT treatment they are significantly increasing over time at an estimated rate of 20% per period. We further tested whether the estimated rate of decrease in the CM of the FR-DFL treatment was significantly different from the prediction of -16.67% and we found, remarkably, that we could not reject the null of no difference (p = .184). Similarly, we tested whether the estimated rate of increase in the CM of the k-PCT treatment was significantly different from the prediction of 16.67%, and we found that the null could be rejected (p = .052) in favor of the alternative that prices were increasing slightly faster.
In Table 12 we examine DM and CM prices over time in the Constant M and FR-IOM treatments, as in these two treatments, we expect prices to be constant over time. We again regress the log of the average DM price and the log of the CM price on the period number within a sequence and dummies for four of the five sessions. The regressions reveal that, with one exception DM and CM prices are constant over time. The exception is for DM prices in the constant M treatment where we observe a small increase in prices over time.
We further consider support for the quantity theory of money in our experimental data. According to the quantity theory, in the steady state, the rate of change of prices equals the rate of change in the money supply. We look for evidence of this quantity theory prediction in our price data both in the DM and the CM. Some evidence in support of the quantity theory prediction is reported in Table 11 where we found that CM prices in the FR-DFL treatment declined at a rate of 14.1 percent and CM prices in the k-PCT treatment increased at a rate of 20 percent, which are close to the predicted 16.67 percent decline or increase, respectively. However, DM prices did not appear to respond appropriately to changes in the money supply. A more direct test of the quantity theory prediction is presented in Table 13 where we regress the log of the average DM price and the log of the CM price on the log of the money supply. The coefficient estimate on log (Money Supply) represents the ratio of the rate of change of prices to the rate of change of the money supply. According to the quantity theory of money, this ratio should equal 1 in both the DM and CM rounds of the FR-DFL and k-PCT treatments. As Table 13 reveals, the coefficient estimates are significantly positive in all cases indicating that prices track changes in the money supply, decreasing in the FR-DFL treatment and increasing in the k-PCT treatment. Consistent with the analysis reported in Table 11 , coefficient estimates on the log (Money Supply) are closer to 1 in the CM than in the DM of these two treatments. Further, we again find that prices significantly under-react to changes in the money supply in the DM and CM of the FR-DFL treatment and in the DM of the k-PCT treatment, and significantly over-react in the CM of the k-PCT treatment.
While inflation/deflation rates in the DM markets were not generally close to the theoretical predictions, the results in Table 14 provide some evidence that inflation, whenever present, acted as a tax. Indeed, as the regression results in this table show, the average quantity produced, q, in a given period of the DM was decreasing (increasing) in average past DM inflation (deflation) rates, %Δp DM . The average quantity produced in the DM did not react strongly to average past inflation/deflation rates of CM prices, %Δp CM . Robust standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Money Holdings and Rebalancing
In this section, we consider the extent to which subjects were using the CM to rebalance their money holdings as well as the distribution of those money holdings over time. We first look for evidence that subjects were using the CM to rebalance their money position as of the end of the DM. To address this issue, we first calculate the change in DM money holdings, Δ DM m, as the difference between beginning of period money holdings and end of DM round money holdings. For the FR-DFL, FR-IOM and k-PCT treatments, the beginning of period DM money holdings are after tax or subsidy, respectively. The change in CM money holdings, Δ CM m, is the difference between end of DM round money holdings and end of CM round money holdings with one exception: for the FR-IOM treatment, we include the proportional interest payment of 20 percent in the end of DM money holdings as these additional tokens were available to subjects at the start of the CM. Table 15 reports on a regression of the change in CM money holdings on DM money holdings for each of the four treatments.
The significantly negative coefficient on Δ DM m in all four treatments provides evidence that subjects were using the CM to rebalance their money holdings. This rebalancing was less then perfect as the coefficient on Δ DM m is significantly different from −1. This finding is comparable to what is reported in Duffy and Puzzello (2014) . In three of the four treatments, the constant term is not significantly different from zero indicating no bias in CM money changes. For the FR-IOM treatment, the constant term is significantly negative, which indicates that changes in CM money holdings were reduced on average by 1 token relative to changes in DM money holdings. We suspect that this bias was due to the 20 percent interest payments that subjects received at the start of the CM in the FR-IOM treatment only. This may reflect some "money illusion" on the part of some subject in the FR-IOM treatment, a notion we define and further discuss in the next section.
Regarding the distribution of money holdings, recall that our assumptions on the utility and cost functions imply that the predicted distribution of money holdings is unique and degenerate at M 2N . In the case of the constant M and FR-IOM treatments, the money stock M is fixed at 140 and 2N is always 14, so the predicted per capita money holdings should always be 10 following the rebalancing of the CM. In the FR-DFL and k-PCT treatments, the money stock changes over time, decreasing in the former and increasing in the latter, so that the degenerate, per capita money holdings should be Mt 2N in periods t = 1, 2, ..., where M t = 140(1 + k) t−1 , and where k = −1/6 in the FR-DFL treatment and k = 1/6 in the k-PCT treatment. We do not find evidence for degeneracy in the distribution of money holdings in any of our treatments. However, we do find some evidence that money holdings are clustered around the per capita predictions -see Appendix A for the details.
Discussion
The finding that intensive margin welfare is highest under the k-PCT rule is puzzling. We consider two possible explanations: 1) Liquidity constraints and 2) Money illusion/Precautionary motives.
We first consider the possibility that liquidity constraints played a role. We note that in all sessions, subjects faced uncertainty about the price levels that would prevail in both the DM and CM rounds. They only learned about prices in the DM if a trade occurred and in the CM, they only learned about prices after the market had cleared. This uncertainty with respect to token prices may have affected subjects' ability to properly re-balance their money holdings in the CM. In addition, in both the FR-DFL and FR-IOM treatments subjects paid a lump-sum token tax at the end of the CM round which further reduced their token holdings. As a result, more subjects in the two FR treatments entered the next DM round with zero or low token balances. By contrast, in the k-PCT treatment, consumers can never enter the DM with 0 tokens since there is a lump-sum transfer of tokens to all players (both consumers and producers) at the end of each CM round. Figure 6 provides support for this conjecture. We observe that 15 percent of consumers in the FR-DFL and 11 percent of consumers in the FR-IOM treatments enter DM rounds with 0 tokens. There is a somewhat lower proportion of consumers with 0 tokens in the Constant M treatment. Most importantly and by design, subjects in the k-PCT treatment always have tokens available at the start of any DM round. The inflation of the k-PCT treatment alleviates liquidity constraints on those who do not properly re-balance in the CM, and this feature of the k-PCT treatment may account for the higher welfare (both overall and intensive margin versions) that we observe in that treatment relative to the other three treatments where the money stock remains constant or decreases over time.
We next consider the possibility that subjects suffered from money illusion. By money illusion, we mean that subjects anchored on their nominal token balances and ignored inflation or deflation of the price level over time so that they did not evaluate DM offers in real terms. Under such money illusion, consumers in the k-PCT treatment may have been more generous in their token offers over time as there was a growing supply of tokens to offer. 23 To address this conjecture, we again consider the offers that consumers made and that were accepted by producers in the DM, but we focus on how generous those token offers were relative to consumer's available token balances. We regressed the ratio of the consumers' token offer, d, to their available token holdings, m c in all DM rounds on three treatment dummy variables, we controlled for the DM quantity that the consumers received in exchange for their token offer (Traded q). Recall that the theoretical prediction is for subjects to offer all of their available tokens in exchange in every DM round, that is, the monetary policy regime (treatment) should not matter. As Table 16 reveals, we find that consumers are significantly more generous with money offers as a percentage of their money holdings in the k-PCT treatment (where they have the most tokens, on average) and significantly less generous in the FR-DFL and FR-IOM treatments (where they have the least tokens on average) relative to the Constant Money control treatment. This evidence is also consistent with a precautionary motive for holding money. Specifically, subjects needed money to pay taxes in the FR-DFL and FR-IOM treatments, where they potentially faced some uncertainty as to whether they would succeed in rebalancing their money holdings in the CM for the dual purpose of paying taxes at the end of the CM and trading in the next DM. On the other hand, subjects did not need to pay taxes following the CM market of the k-PCT treatment. Furthermore, subjects also received a lump-sum transfer at the end of the CM, so they were sure they would have tokens at the beginning of the subsequent DM. These factors may have also facilitated more generous offers in the k-PCT treatment relative to other treatments. Standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Further Experiments
Another puzzling finding is that we do not observe much deflation or inflation in the DM of the FR-DFL and k-PCT treatments, respectively. By contrast, we did observe deflation or inflation in the CM of these two treatments-see Table 11 . One explanation for this difference is that in the DM, prices are specific to each pair, and no-trade outcomes are frequent. Consequently, price signals may be weaker in the DM as compared with the CM where all players participate in determining the market price and all see the same CM price. This observation led us to consider a different version of our model where the price formation mechanism in the DM is replaced by a market game of the same type used in the CM. 24 We retain the gains from trade in the DM by partitioning subjects randomly into consumers or producers in each period. Consumers decide how many of their tokens to bid for units of the DM good and producers decide how many units to produce. The single DM market price is determined in the same manner as in the CM, by the ratio of the amount bid by all consumers divided by the amount produced by all producers and all exchanges take place at this single market price. Otherwise, the environment is the same and so the steady state predictions of the model also remain unchanged (since in the previous experiments we use a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining protocol and the cost function in the DM of those experiments is linear). Rather than referring to the markets as the DM and CM, in these new experimental sessions, we refer to them as market 1 and market 2, as both markets are now centralized. Replacing the bilateral bargaining in market 1 with a single centralized market price may help monetary policy to have more impact on deflation or inflation of the price level and therefore on welfare. Using this different, two centralized markets design, we conducted one session of each of our four treatments using the same procedures and the same sequence lengths used in session 1 of each of those treatments (as shown in Table 2 ). Each of these four new sessions involved 14 new subjects with no prior experience in our other treatments (for a total of 14 × 4 = 56 additional subjects). The instructions for these four new sessions were modified to explain the centralized market in the first round of each two-round period (the former DM). 25 With this change in design, we now observe that there is deflation in the FR-DFL treatment and inflation in the k-PCT treatment in both markets 1 and 2 as shown in Table 17 . Recall that in our original experimental design, we did not observe such deflation or inflation of prices in the DM (market 1) of those two treatments. Table 18 reveals that there is little or no changes in prices in the two markets of the Constant M or FR-IOM treatments as we also found previously. Overall welfare, relative to the first best, is higher for all treatments as compared with our prior experiment as can be seen by comparing Figure 7 with Figure 3 . However, we continue to find that welfare is lower in the two Friedman rule treatments as compared with the Constant M and k-PCT treatments as shown in Figure 7 . The change in market 1 institution does reduce the incidence of consumers with zero money holdings relative to the bilateral bargaining setting as revealed in Figure 8 , but this reduction in liquidity constrained consumers does not suffice to improve welfare in the two Friedman rule treatments. We continue to find that consumers are more generous with their bids in the k-PCT treatment where they have more tokens on average, and least generous in the FR-DFL treatment where they have the least tokens on average as shown in Table 19 .
Conclusions
The Friedman rule is the "most celebrated proposition in...'pure' monetary theory." (Woodford 1990 (Woodford , p. 1068 . The rule is that monetary policy should be conducted so as to implement a zero nominal interest rate, which can be achieved by decreasing the supply of money at the real rate of interest on alternative safe assets or by paying that same rate of interest on money holdings. To our knowledge the Friedman rule has not been implemented in practice, perhaps because of various implementation challenges, e.g., limited price flexibility, lump-sum taxation, or the administration costs of paying interest on money. However, these challenges can be overcome in the laboratory where we can implement the "simple hypothetical society" that Friedman (1969) mulating the monetary policy rule that was optimal for that environment. While the Friedman rule is the optimal monetary policy in a wide variety of monetary models, we choose to implement it in the Lagos and Wright (2005) model, a tractable, micro-founded environment that makes explicit the frictions giving rise to the use of money. We find that the Friedman rule, while theoretically optimal, is no better than a constant money supply rule in terms of welfare. Further, the manner in which the Friedman rule is implemented, by decreasing the money supply at a constant rate over time or by paying interest on money holdings does not matter much for this result. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, quantities traded and intensive margin welfare are highest in the k-PCT treatment. In practice, current monetary policy in most developed countries aims for an inflation target of 2 percent, which bears closest resemblance our k-PCT treatment.
We attribute our findings to a combination of liquidity constraints and money illusion/precautionary motives. In future research, it would be of interest to explore modifications to our model that could further our understanding of the departures from theoretical predictions. For instance, Jiang et al. (2018) consider the k-PCT rule and other inflationary policies with centralized markets and fixed roles in both markets. Another possibility would be to automate the centralized market to facilitate the necessary re-balancing of money holdings. Future research could also explore other types of monetary policies in the contest of the Lagos-Wright environment that we study. For instance, one could add credit markets, multiple currencies and assets and explore the impact of more explicit monetary policies, involving, e.g., open market operations. We think that laboratory experiments are a natural complement to theoretical and empirical analyses of the impact of monetary policy using non-experimental field data. Our paper provides evidence that such experiments are both possible and informative.
Appendix A: Additional Experimental Results

Distribution of Money Holdings
Here we report on the distribution of money holdings at the beginning of the DM across all four treatments (except for the first period, where money holdings are given). For the Constant M and FR-IOM treatments, the money supply is constant and so the distribution of token holdings should be degenerate at 10 tokens per subject. Figures 9-10 show the distribution of per capita money holdings at the start of the DM of these two treatments. The distributions are divided up between the first and second halves of each sequence of all sessions of each treatment. As these figures reveal, in the first half of each sequence, per capita token holdings are more closely concentrated but are not degenerate at 10. In the second half of each sequence, the per capita token holdings become more diffuse. For the other two treatments, the aggregate money supply decreases or increases depending on the rule in place. Therefore we report the distribution of money holdings at two different periods in a sequence to give a sense of how per capita money holdings change over time. In particular, we report on the distribution of money holdings in the second period and in the fourth period (conditional on those periods being reached) across all sessions of the FR-DFL and k-PCT treatments. Figure 11 shows the distribution of money holdings for periods 2 (left panel) and 4 (right) panel of the FR-DFL treatment, while Figure 12 does the same for the k-PCT treatment. For the FR-DFL treatment, token holdings in period 2 should be degenerate at 8.33 and in period 4 they should be degenerate at 4.82. As Figure 11 reveals, the distributions are not degenerate at these predicted levels but the distribution is moving to the left from period 2 to period 4, and becomes more dispersed in the later period. For the k-PCT treatment, token holdings in period 2 should be degenerate at 11.67 and in period 4 they should be degenerate at 15.88. While again, there is no support for the prediction that the distribution of token holdings is degenerate at these two numbers, we see that the per capita token holdings are shifting to the right from period 2 to period 4 and are becoming widely dispersed in the later period 4 as compared with the earlier period 2.
